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Abstract
Contact tracing is an important instrument for national health services to fight epidemics.
As part of the COVID-19 situation, many proposals have been made for scaling up contract
tracing capacities with the help of smartphone applications, an important but highly criti-
cal endeavor due to the privacy risks involved in such solutions. Extending our previously
expressed concern, we clearly articulate in this article, the functional and non-functional
requirements that any solution has to meet, when striving to serve, not mere collections
of individuals, but the whole of a nation, as required in face of such potentially dangerous
epidemics. We present a critical information infrastructure, PriLock, a fully-open prelim-
inary architecture proposal and design draft for privacy preserving contact tracing, which
we believe can be constructed in a way to fulfill the former requirements. Our architecture
leverages the existing regulated mobile communication infrastructure and builds upon the
concept of “checks and balances”, requiring a majority of independent players to agree to
effect any operation on it, thus preventing abuse of the highly sensitive information that
must be collected and processed for efficient contact tracing. This is enforced with a largely
decentralised layout and highly resilient state-of-the-art technology, which we explain in the
paper, finishing by giving a security, dependability and resilience analysis, showing how it
meets the defined requirements, even while the infrastructure is under attack.
1 Introduction
In an earlier text published on LinkedIn1, we justified the reasons behind our belief that a national
infrastructure is indispensable to attend to the needs of nations in the presence of threats posed
by modern pathological agents, of which COVID-19 is but an example of the future, and —
according to specialists — perhaps a mild one. Contact tracing (CT), that is the systematic
identification of potentially infected individuals by tracing and testing those that had been in
contact with a known infected person and where a transmission of the virus may have happened,
has been an effective measure to confine the COVID-19 outbreak in the early phase after new
year, but ceased to be effective the moment NHS tracing capacities got exhausted. Aside from
COVID-19, the effectiveness of CT has been demonstrated in many outbreaks [17, 37, 29, 18]. For
example, WHO reports the essential role of CT in controlling Ebola outbreaks in Africa2. The
goal of digital contact tracing3 is to automate CT and as such increase NHS tracing capacities by
several orders of magnitude to extend the time when CT remains effective in chasing exponentially
1https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/citizen-protecting-proximity-tracing-covid-19-between-paulo
2https://www.who.int/csr/disease/ebola/training/contact-tracing/en/
3https://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/early/2020/03/30/science.abb6936.full.pdf
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growing infection rates. However, such a proposal should preserve fundamental needs and goals,
some of which hard to reconcile, such as efficiency and effectiveness, as well as coverage, fairness
and privacy for population.
Surprisingly or not, most of the recent debate has been centred around cryptographic aspects.
However, we believe this to be a distributed critical information systems problem at its centre.
Only by treating it with the relevant body of knowledge will we reach the goals. By this,
we mean the right combination of s.o.t.a. ICT technologies (distributed algorithms, fault and
intrusion tolerance, networking and cloud technology, cryptography), guided by requirements
from the several societal sectors, not only national health services and epidemiologists, but also
economists, for example.
We propose the architecture of PriLock: Citizen-protecting distributed epidemic
tracing, a critical information infrastructure (CII). The values we wish to safeguard in the
design we make public, are:
• Maximizing nation-wide coverage of people and territory
• Ensuring near real-time situational awareness through whole epidemic life cy-
cles
• Transparent protection of citizens’ rights, not just privacy, but also inclusive-
ness and fairness.
• Resilience against data- and system-based social and technical threats.
• Preservation of digital sovereignty.
• Protection of economy by precise and selective throttling (closing and opening).
In a nutshell, PriLock should be oriented at the protection of populations, cities, countries,
trans-border regions, in the face of epidemics. The objectives outlined above imply the partici-
pation of a plurality of stakeholders, and for effectiveness, should leverage on existing CIIs, such
as the NHS systems and the Telco networks, both of which regulated sectors. This preliminary
proposal attempts at giving guidance to architects and designers of infrastructures, about de-
sign avenues for devising a citizen-protecting distributed epidemic tracing critical information
infrastructure.
A CII of this kind is logically centralised in nature. However, in distributed systems logical
centralisation does not necessarily imply monopolist trust models, or physical centralisation. Nor
decentralisation or peer-to-peer prevent abuses per se. Both misconceptions have been part of
recent debates456. The PriLock architecture follows best practices in distributed and resilient
critical information systems design. It uses geographical decentralisation to reduce the baseline
threat plane, both at the periphery and at the core. Its management trust model does not follow
a centralised, monopolist philosophy, but a consensual one, where abuse is technically prevented
since no operation can be executed by single or minority groups of entities, and all critical
operations require intervention of a quorum of the (independent) entrusted entities ("checks and
balances").
The core facilities themselves are also largely decentralised, distributed and/or replicated at
the entrusted entities sites. However, this PriLock network of components establishes perimeter
isolation from the legacy systems, with very clear entry/exit points. This isolation is strengthened
with defence-in-depth mechanisms implementing a high degree of fault and intrusion tolerance.
The resulting threat plane reduction in face of external and internal attacks or faults is a key
aspect, to achieve resilience in general, and privacy in particular, despite handling critical data.
4https://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2020/04/12/contact-tracing-in-the-real-world/
5https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/399.pdf
6https://nadim.computer/posts/2020-04-17-pepppt.html
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Unlike some recently published approaches (e.g., exclusively based on Bluetooth), we favour
technologies that promote incremental inclusion of all population strata — economic, literacy or
age. As such, we see currently no alternative to the mobile communication system as a baseline.
We aim as well at protecting digital sovereignty, avoiding as much as possible solutions that open
considerable threat planes like those affecting phone-to-phone attacks or generating inconsiderate
dependence on phone/OS vendors, which might for example cause massive leakage of national
critical data to unidentified threat actors. Finally, we consider that only a global approach can
provide the accuracy and near real-time timeliness of information required for a low risk, high
effectiveness throttling of the economy.
In a nutshell, our proposal attempts at striking a balance between securing health,
protecting privacy and safeguarding the economy.
2 Requirements specification
To be clear about the objectives and trade-offs of PriLock, we discuss below all the desirable
requirements that we believe should be met by an infrastructure of this kind, and the rationale
for meeting them.
2.1 Desirable objectives and implied requirements
We list the almost indispensable functional objectives that should be reached by any nation-level
critical infrastructure doing digital contact tracing (CT) (R1-R6):
R1 Be epidemic-agnostic: able to act on any epidemic, even the unexpected, in near real-time.
R2 Help find the highest possible rate of infected individuals in near real-time.
R3 Help find reasonably complete and accurate potential infection chains in near real-time.
R4 Alert, monitor, confine, and trace potentially infected individuals in near real-time.
R5 Diagnose country/region/community epidemic dynamics in near real-time (map basic infec-
tion evolution numbers; locate and map infection hotspots and trajectories; detect super
infectors and/or lone wolves; predict collections of asymptomatic individuals; discern be-
tween external and communal infection paths).
R6 Incorporate lessons and feedback from first epidemic outbreaks and adapt further actions
during individual re-infections and epidemic recurrences, in near real-time.
Additionally, the following non-functional objectives should be met (R7-R10):
R7 Guarantees of protecting citizens’ fundamental rights (such as transparency, privacy and
equality) in compliance with the law.
R8 Resilience to manipulation and forging, fake-news, gossip, panic, denial of service.
R9 Sustained real-time capability under overload, to maintain situational analysis and reaction
capacity (infection roadblocks; sanitary fences around hotspots; group quarantines; and later,
precise selective re-opening).
R10 Smoothly incremental accuracy and recall of proximity event determination, from an inclu-
sive though possibly coarse sovereign nation-wide baseline technology level, to finer levels
attainable by s.o.t.a. technology (not only but including 5G).
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2.2 Rationale
If those requirements are met, we are bound to have a CII (critical information infrastructure)
that really serves a nation and its individuals, in the possibly hard times to come in the next
years7. Furthermore, their correct implementation guarantees that the 7 fundamental principles
of the GDPR [19] are followed: lawfulness, fairness and transparency; purpose limitation; data
minimisation; accuracy; storage limitation; integrity and confidentiality; accountability.
The possible criticality and magnitude of future epidemic surges advises that nations be pre-
pared: instead of reactive, be proactive. Moreover, the time is now, and not during the next
epidemic surge.
We believe this is a task for the state, as one stakeholder of the nation. It should have
the important responsibility (political as well as economic) of its implementation and operation,
relying on other stakeholders (regulated companies, regulators, public associations, for example).
However, the people, individuals or collections thereof (who ‘are’ the nation) have a right to
enjoy the CII on an equal basis (regardless of their technical literacy), release PII (personally
identifiable information) lawfully, only on a need basis, by the principles of storage limitation
and data minimisation, and having transparent access to its design and operation auditing.
It would be excellent if no involvement of PII would be needed, given the criticality, but such
an infrastructure, if it is to protect the nation, it must get to the nation.
There are currently a number of proposals for digital contact tracing, including DP3T8,
TraceTogether, ROBERT9, TCN10, NTK11, Canetti-Trachtenberg-Varia [9], the Apple/Google’s
joint initiative for Bluetooth distance measurement in iOS/Android12, Pronto-C2 [4], PACT-
WEST [11], PACT-EAST 13, Reichert-Brack-Scheuermann [33], etc., which we do not wish to
criticize negatively, since all contributions are not too many in these critical times. We believe
nevertheless that a good test of their fitness for the purpose would be for the authors showing
that they pass the Litmus test of meeting the requirements R1-10 above. Some proposals,
however focused, present very elegant algorithmic solutions to parts of the big picture addressed
by PriLock. We should not exclude the possibility of considering their contribution.
In this sense, we believe that approaches peer-to-peer managed (actually or pseudo-
decentralised), and voluntarist (totally or mostly based on word-of-mouth gossip), will work
to a certain point, but will miss some important objectives of the list above, not least, the equal-
ity of access and coverage of population, and the capacity for global (nation-wide) reasoning.
However, approaches centrally managed (single entity), and top-down controlled (totally
or mostly based on the «Trust me because I tell you to!» principle), and as such opaque, will
work as well, but miss another set of equally important objectives listed, not least, by losing
confidence of the people in terms of privacy, and perpetuating a state of surveillance.
It is our opinion that the risks impending on the PII can be significantly mitigated, with an
adequate mix of the right social/political management framework and state-of-the-art technical
measures to safeguard the information. This being achieved, the benefits (R1-10) will largely
outweigh the risks.
An infrastructure such as we envisage, albeit supported by the state, must not be built
or managed in a fully centralised way. It should instead be managed in concertation through
consensual actions by several powers exerting mutual control (“checks and balances”),
in respect for the PII it will store and process. Correctness of these consensual actions must
of course be technically enforced by robust technologies, such as protocols of the BFT class
7https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-pandemic-isnt-a-black-swan-but-a-portent-
of-a-more-fragile-global-system
8https://github.com/DP-3T/documents
9https://github.com/ROBERT-proximity-tracing/documents
10https://tcn-coalition.org/
11https://github.com/pepp-pt
12https://www.apple.com/covid19/contacttracing/
13https://pact.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/The-PACT-protocol-specification-ver-0.1.pdf
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(Byzantine Fault Tolerance), playing together with multiparty cryptography protocols. These
technologies, albeit sophisticated, have today a high technology readiness level (TRL), spawned
by its increasing use in a number of real workd applications, notably the Fintech/Blockchain
area.
Furthermore, the infrastructure should be dormant (locked and largely empty of information)
most of the time, only to be activated in times of need, by multiparty decisions; PII information
collected should be disposed of immediately it is no longer needed; PII information at rest
during active periods should be protected with strong multiparty cryptography, and so forth. In
consequence, such an infrastructure must be designed and implemented using the best technical
practices available to ensure all these objectives.
For this to be done without large impact on the efficiency, the decision and operation pro-
cesses should be streamlined and based on IT-supported workflows, but attested and certified
continuously (e.g., by indelible logging apparatus and/or blockchain supported ledgers). Ex-ante
and ex-post auditing should be put in place, effected by an independent regulation body. Citizens
should as well have transparent access to the modus operandi and the results of the regulation
actions.
3 Preliminary Architecture and Draft Design
We present a fully-open Preliminary Architecture Proposal and Draft Design of PriLock. Our
purpose is not to give a fully-fledged design, but rather to give guidance to architects and
designers of such infrastructures, should these ideas merit the support of the main stakeholders
in a nation, certainly the state and the citizens. As such, we do not intend to go into too much
further detail in the sections below, beyond giving the outline and skeleton of protocols and
mechanisms, showing that the main architectural, data model and algorithmic design options
meet the requirements R1-R10. The design is also open enough that, within the margin we leave
for the technical options, different nations may strike different balances between securing health,
protecting privacy and safeguarding the economy.
3.1 Introduction
Generically, the PriLock infrastructure is implemented and controlled by a “Federation for Epi-
demic Surges Protection- EpiProtect ”. In the context of this paper, EpiProtect is the designation
of the necessary coalition of interest formed by entities of the state — such as relevant govern-
ment ministries, National Health Service entities like centres for disease control and hospitals,
Justice, an independent Regulation body for the CII — and regulated companies, regulators, re-
search and technology institutes and universities, public associations, for example. The PriLock
infrastructure, albeit supported by the state, is managed not in a fully centralised way, but in
concertation, by several powers exerting mutual control (“checks and balances”), in respect for
the PII it will store and process. In essence, the PriLock Entrusted Authorities (PEA) is a sub-
set of the entities listed above, whose number and quality/role will depend on specific countries’
culture and legal systems. PEA members are those that can collectively issue authorisations for
the manipulation of PriLock. As seen below, all such operations must be vetted by a quorum of
the PEA. Other entities such as listed above will be PriLock-Associated Entities (ASE ).
3.2 Architecture components
Figure 1 gives an overview of the architecture. It is worth noting that, following a successful
concept in previous research on critical information infrastructures, the technology required is al-
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ready available (e.g., but not exclusively from the EU projects CRUTIAL14, MASSIF15, BBC16,
SEGRID17). PriLock attempts at leveraging (rather than replacing or duplicating) existing CIIs,
in this case the legacy Telco and Public Administration infrastructures in general, and the Mobile
Communication system in particular. As such, as seen in the Figure, whilst the existing legacy
systems are represented in brown, PriLock is laid out as an overlay architecture over them,
represented in blue. Furthermore, to ease integration and cause minimal disturbance, PriLock
components are highly modular and self contained (information switches, cloud subsystems).
This perimeter isolation with very clear entry/exit points (boundaries between brown and blue
in the Figure) is also key to security and dependability. As we show ahead, it is strengthened
with other defence-in-depth mechanisms in order to attain the very high levels of resilience de-
sired.
Figure 1: PriLock architecture
3.2.1 Edge realm
Telco Operator and Service Provider (Provider in short) cellular network cells such
as macrocells, microcells, picocells, and femtocells (existing).
We leverage the existence of the cellular public network, since any ‘live’ mobile phone will be
in contact with at least one Provider (or potentially more, in case of roaming), in any covered
location. PriLock is set up as an overlay architecture over/aside the cellular systems, and tries to
cause the least disturbance possible on the cellular network. However, we consider that PriLock,
as a regulated infrastructure of public interest, may reasonably imply some minimal changes on
the Providers, as described below.
14https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/848109
15https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/257475
16https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/317871
17https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/607109
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Currently, the cellular network has a degree of variation in the implementations, according
to Providers’ structure and xG generation. In what follows, we provide a general outline of a
prototypical architecture, for simplicity and without loss of generality. In cellular networks, small
cells are employed to enhance the link quality and network capacity [31]. Several types of small
cells include femtocells, picocells, microcells, and macrocells – broadly increasing in size from
femtocells which are the smallest, to macrocells which are the largest. The network is normally
organised in cells, nominally covering a geographical region, by sets of antennas controlled by
the cell Base Station. Cells from the same provider, or from different providers, overlap in their
spatial coverage.
The Figure 2 suggests the current reality of the cellular (mobile communications) system, and
the small add-ons that may be implanted by PriLock (fBS in blue, explained below). Macro-
cells (standard cells and microcells) implement the external (street) structure, respectively by
macrocell Base Stations, mBS. Communication inside premises (e.g., internal parkings, theatres,
shopping malls) is secured by additional, finer granularity, picocells, from a given provider, con-
trolled respectively by picocell Base Stations, pBS. These are aggregated under the realm of the
macrocell that subtends them, by a hierarchical logical structure, called paging cell. The useful
ranges of the pBS of a same paging cell partially overlap in their spatial coverage. A phone will
register to a cell upon arrival (e.g., through the macrocell base station mBS), and after that the
communication enters stand-by listening mode to save energy. From then on it can be paged by
any of the base stations in that paging cell (e.g., walking through a shopping mall) on a need
basis (e.g. an incoming call or SMS).
Figure 2: PriLock integration with cellular network infrastructure
The information flow will be detailed in a later section, but a key data structure for the
process described below is introduced now: Proximity Detail Record (PDR) — containing, for
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each region (cell), the timestamps of contiguous periods of time spent in the region by a phone,
the average proximity vector from the centroid, plus an encoded ID of the region BS.
Technically, it is possible today that:
(i) mBS or pBS calculate the proximity of a phone to the centroid of the users distribution of
the respective antenna set, as a relative position;
(ii) several pBS of a paging cell can periodically page a phone on purpose to determine that
proximity vector (e.g., a polar coordinate from the centroid) and generate a PDR;
(iii) the mBS and several pBS of a paging cell can triangulate their space-time readings of
proximity of a same phone, in order to get a much more precise value of the relative
position of the phone relative to the antenna set, and create the respective more precise
PDR;
(iv) in alternative, that triangulation can be performed later, over independently recorded PDR
registers by several BS, containing space-time readings of proximity of a same phone to those
BS, relative to a similar time interval;
(v) none of these registers need to contain absolute location information.
Edge Telco Provider Cellular Controlling Data Center (existing).
We denote the cellular Controlling Data Centers (DC) generically (provider implementations
vary), as the first DC on the edge of the provider network where PDRs collected by the base
station network can be concentrated and stored systematically.
Edge PriLock Secure Cloud (PSC) (in Telco Provider Cellular Controlling Data
Centers).
The Edge PriLock Secure Clouds (PSC) are the PriLock-supplied subsystems co-located in each
Controlling Data Center of Providers. The PDRs are stored encrypted in this installation as
they come from the BS, by the Provider, which has a write-only (push) interface to the Secure
Cloud. After PDRs are stored in the cloud, they can no longer be accessed by the provider.
Edge PriLock Information Switches (Edge PIS) (containing the edge services and
connection to the VPN).
The Edge PIS are the points of contact of the edge secure clouds with the core systems, through
the EpiProtect VPN (see below). They also run services that manage the information in the
secure cloud. We foresee that these data secure the principles of data minimization and storage
limitation followed by data protection authorities and the GDPR in general, by: containing
minimal information about phones only; ibid about presence under cellular network cells, i.e.
relative location, i.e. proximity, not absolute location; being automatically deleted after a time-
to-live period to be defined, a function of the target disease incubation time.
3.2.2 BASE 0 - Proximity Tracing with Cellular components
Proximity Tracing with cellular components has incremental levels of precision, from older xG
or e.g. rural areas where the useful range of mBS may be kilometers, through metropolitan
areas where it may be a couple dozen meters or less, to inside premises pBS, where it can come
down to a few meters. This approach shows a virtuous adaptation of accuracy to human density,
providing a predictable rate of false positives grossly proportional to predicted urban density.
The approach also promotes inclusion, since: 30% of the population is estimated not to own
a smartphone, and most older people are not tech-savvy. Thus, including older people in a
system that works automatically for them, and with a predictable rate of false positives grossly
proportional to age (and thus health risk) and tech-illiteracy, seems as well a virtuous trade-off
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for an infrastructure of public interest. From the viewpoint of the national interest, it is also
the one offering better reliability, security and sovereignty conditions for a start, since it does
not suffer from the considerable threat plane affecting phone-to-phone attacks, or the phone/OS
vendor interference (both in GPS and in Bluetooth sensing).
Experiments will need to be done to determine the actual levels of accuracy and recall of
contact tracing allowed by the several technical levels of the baseline system (mBS, pBS, trian-
gulation) as we have described.
Some things should be noted however: (i) the problem with older generation equipment is
expected to lie mostly with accuracy, i.e. in alerting too many people, rather than missing
infected/infector people; (ii) if our conjecture is correct, this would concern the virtuous com-
binations mentioned above and thus be a good trade-off; (iii) on the other hand, accuracy will
be most important in points likely to become infection hotspots (packed-layout restaurants and
other commercial surfaces, bars, theatres, sports halls, PoS, etc.), where again, newer generation
equipment is more expected; (iv) next we discuss ways to further improve accuracy thinking
about these spots.
3.2.3 BASE 1 - Proximity Tracing with Cellular Enhanced components
PriLock cells.
We go further in solving this remaining problem and improving the precision and accuracy of
contact tracing given by this baseline architecture, by selectively enhancing them in the most
needed points (as the examples just above). We go down one order of magnitude in spatial
range, inspired by the femtocell principle in mobile networks. Femtocell is a small, low-power
low-capacity base station, with a useful range of a few meters, typically designed to solve coverage
corner cases, or serve homes or small businesses.
The analogy stops there, and we introduce PriLock special femtocells (depicted in blue in
the Figure 2), implemented and controlled by dummy base stations that we call fBS. Inside a
given paging cell, there may be several fBS, installed in consonance with the respective Provider.
fBS present themselves to phones as genuine base stations of a paging cell. So they can force
the periodical paging of a phone in the (very small) area of their useful range. After each ping,
they do not perform mobile communication, which is ensured by having the phone connect to
another pBS in the area with overlapping coverage.
Technically, it is possible that mBS and pBS are software-enhanced (with few exceptions) so
that fBS can interact with mBS and pBS nearby in a simple manner:
(i) by having them calculate and store the proximity of the fBS the same way they do with
phones, triangulating their space-time readings in order to get a precise value of the relative
position of the fBS relative to the antenna set (this operation is done once per fBS set-up,
since the fBS is not expected to move relative to the mobile system BSs, in principle);
(ii) whenever this is not possible, the fBS can be georeferenced by hand through a GIS of the
area.
(iii) by sending the related paging events of phones that enter and leave their range to one of
the mBS or pBS (which issue a PDR with the respective timestamps, the average proximity
vector of the fBS from the centroid of the issuing BS, and an encoded ID of the latter).
The PDR thus contains a point with much higher precision than what is achieved even by
picocells.
Alternative proximity tracing technologies.
PriLock assumes a default baseline measurement approach based on the cellular apparatus, for
inclusion, fairness and completeness. Then, it improves on the baseline through the above-
mentioned described PriLock pseudo femtocell.
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However, it welcomes integration of other approaches, for example those working on a vol-
untary basis, possibly for complementing information in specific situations and areas, e.g., GPS,
Bluetooth, Wifi or other.
However, this must be done with care, always taking into account the non-functional objec-
tives (R7-R10), in particular digital sovereignty.
3.2.4 Virtual Private Network (VPN) realm
This block is essentially materialised by the protocols implementing the Federation for Epidemic
Surges Protection (EpiProtect) VPN, linking the institutions entrusted to manage epidemic trac-
ing, and associated institutions.
The VPN is supposed to interconnect all nodes of the architecture, through Edge and Core
PriLock Information Switches: Edge PriLock Secure Clouds (PSC); Core PriLock Secure Clouds
(PSC); PriLock Complex Event Processing Engine (PCEPE); PriLock Data Vault (PDV); any
PriLock Entrusted Authorities (PEA) not co-located in one of the facilities listed above; and
privileged PriLock-Associated Entities (ASE ) needing secure access.
3.2.5 Edge realm: associated entities
PriLock-Associated Entities (ASE) facilities (existing).
PriLock is destined to fulfill several societal objectives. As such, it is natural that one of the
needs is the secure information export to, or import from, external entities needing to work on
it. The particular information may or not have privacy criticality.
In consequence, PAE that only need to receive or send non-critical information will do so by
standard information transfer mechanisms. PAE that need to receive or send critical information
as well MUST do so via mechanisms provided through the Federation for Epidemic Surges
Protection (EpiProtect) VPN.
This will be implemented by means of a protocol to be established between the EpiProtect
and the relevant PAE, and materialised through an Edge PriLock Information Switch (Edge PIS)
connected to the VPN, similar to those used in the Telco Providers edge.
Any significant amount of critical information leaving the PDV to ASE (PriLock-Associated
Entities), e.g., for research purposes (such as statistical collection and epidemics modelling),
should provide strong guarantees of anonymity and generic protection of any PII (that has in
the meantime not been made non-private, e.g., according to the laws of some countries with
regard to notifiable diseases). N.B.- The words of caution made about in-core workflows under
more sophisticated operations are echoed here by majority of reason, for externalisation of infor-
mation to associated entities or the public. Before allowing, in further versions of PriLock, more
aggressive release of information without raising the risk, and additionally to what was suggested
for the improvement of the security of the in-core workflows, further research is suggested on the
investigation and verification of algorithms allowing privacy-preserving information disclosure,
for example leveraging s.o.t.a. on k-anonymity [38] and its successive refinments [32, 30], or
differential privacy [14, 15, 16].
3.2.6 Core realm
The Core realm consists of facilities containing the storage and computing capacity to handle
the PriLock operation. To be instrumented in facilities of the PriLock Entrusted Authorities
(PEA), as extensions of existing installations, or created anew.
Core PriLock Information Switches (Core PIS).
Containing some core services and the connection to the VPN).
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Core PriLock Secure Clouds (PSC).
In the PEA Data Centers, containing private storage and compute clouds supporting other com-
ponents, see below). The Core PriLock Secure Clouds (PSC) are a compound of clouds in the
core facilities of PriLock (PEA). They offer the decentralised basis for running distributed pro-
tocols implementing the PriLock Complex Event Processing Engine in a distributed and parallel
instantiation, and the PriLock Data Vault in a resilient (fault and intrusion tolerant) way. Both
are described below.
PriLock Complex Event Processing Engine (PCEPE).
PCEPE is the engine where computations are massively run, in principle implemented in one or
more Core PriLock Secure Clouds (PSC), in PEA Data Centers.
In PCEPE, collected events (paging information) are processed and tracing information is
extracted and stored in data vault. PCEPE has to operate on streams of information, in near
real-time and, above all, has to be implemented as trusted computing service. PCEPE is de-
signed as a streaming system as it has to run continuous queries on constantly arriving input
data, in order, to capture the ever changing locations of potential subjects. On the contrary,
batch processing would require storing of large volume of raw data and would be inefficient for
this purpose. PCEPE architecture has to be dependable, and at the same time, scalable. Such
complex processing engines already exist as a research prototypes, i.e. Massif project [21, 22,
8], but also reached maturity level where they have been adopted by industry and deployed in
production, including BeepBeep-3 [5], Apache Flink and Storm [3], SQLstream [36].
PriLock Data Vault (PDV).
PDV is the main data repository. Though logically centralised, the PriLock Data Vault (PDV)
construction is NOT physically centralised. It is distributed, as depicted in Figure 3 and as we
explain below, amongst several PEA entity nodes, an independence that provides decentralisation
of operation and resilience to faults and attacks. PDV is essentially a data store, in principle
key-value in its nucleous, implemented by one or several core private storage clouds where pre-
processed and post-processed data are stored. To reap performance benefits, the compute clouds
needed to perform the PriLock workflows are co-located in the same PEA facilties, as shown
in the figure. The highly secure workflows PriLock is destined to run, are coordinated from
distributed protocols running on the VPN, in the several core PriLock information switches
(Core PIS) which, recalling Figure 1, isolate and connect the PriLock components running in
several facilities.
The PriLock VPN and Data Vault compound represented in Figure 3 is a crucial building
block which builds on a large body of knowledge on fault and intrusion tolerance and resilience
(e.g., Byzantine fault-tolerance, cloud-of-clouds tech., multiparty cryptography, erasure coding,
etc.). One of the central fears and a threat to be reckoned with is the execution of sensitive
operations by a single or minority groups of entities. PriLock addresses these possible threat
vectors by requiring consensus for all critical operations by a quorum of independent entrusted
entities. At the level of machines invoking services at other machines, classical solutions, such
as Byzantine fault tolerant state-machine replication protocols (e.g., PBFT [10], MinBFT [39],
CheapBFT [27], but also variants deployed in modern blockchains [2, 1, 23, 24, 34, 20, 28]) are
readily available.
We detail the security and dependability aspects of the PriLock VPN and Data Vault com-
pound represented in Figure 3, in the next section.
3.2.7 Security and dependability aspects
Security and dependability of Core subsystems: Policy aspects.
Queries, and direct reads and writes can be made on PDV under incremental authentication and
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Figure 3: PriLock Data Vault: Consensual triggering of operations
authorisation policies established by policy makers, issued by quorums of the PEA entities and
implemented by the technologies underlying PDV.
As explained elsewhere, PriLock follows generically a 2q-eyes access control policy: it is
necessary that q entities amongst the n entrusted ones, vet any transaction that modifies or
extracts information from the Vault. The size of quorum q may vary with the class of operation
(also discussed elsewhere).
Generically, depending on the operation, q corresponds for example to x+1 minimum number
of unblocking shares of an (x+1, n) multiparty crypto operation, such as a threshold signature,
or the recovery of the (x+1,n) shared key protecting PDRs in edge clouds, or other processed
records in the core data vault clouds. The quorum q may also correspond to some f+1-fault
tolerant quorum of entities needed to secure a majority vote on operations that relinquish, or
allow modification of, information in the PDV.
The workflow to gather the necessary authorisations should be apparent to the entities in-
volved. For example, when requested by one of the entities involved in the activities of the Epi-
demic Tracing and Prediction Federation, it only goes ahead after being authorised by enough
other entrusted entities. For this to be done without large impact on the efficiency, decision and
operation processes should be streamlined and based on IT-supported workflows (e.g., through
some form of ERP systems workflow support).
In the example of Figure 3, such authorised requests for single operations or workflows (1)
(gathering the necessary number and qualities of signatures) are arriving at the PriLock interface,
broadcast to all core PIS. The BFT protocols in the PIS run in order to reach a consensus (2).
Each PIS resides in a facility that is managed by and represents an independent stakeholder of
the system, as we have discussed before. That is, even in the presence of f faulty players or
attackers, in the end there is at least a majority number of correct players agreeing on what the
workflow should be, and thus ending-up deciding to execute the correct workflow (3).
Now, the workflow, as depicted in the Figure, combines access to the data at rest in the stor-
age clouds, with the computational elements in the compute clouds, for example, the PCEPE.
The workflow is triggered by the BFT protocols in the PIS, ensuring that it is correctly im-
plemented, and maintaining the security properties desired of the Vault data, namely privacy.
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Again, no data can be extracted except in a consensual manner.
Security and dependability of Core subsystems: Technology aspects.
In order to prevent the risks to security and dependability (most especially abuses against pri-
vacy), we have just seen that the policies behind management and access control of the PriLock
Data Vault (PDV) are not single point. We have explained that PEA, the group of entities
entrusted to manage it, must be formed following the checks-and-balances principles.
It is important to explain the workings and structure of the PriLock Data Vault (PDV)
construction with a bit more detail, which we do in Figure 4, as that storage repository assumes
an enormous criticality in the operation of PriLock, since it holds primarily PII.
Again, principles of distributed fault and intrusion tolerance (a.k.a. Byzantine fault toler-
ance, BFT) are followed in the implementation of the mechanisms controlling the access to the
repository, and the repository units implementing the latter. This middleware transforms the
logical centralisation in physical decentralisation, over a set of distributed nodes. For example,
secret sharing [35] prevents unilateral reconstruction of confidential information (e.g., by ma-
licious insiders), erasure coding [26] provides the same property for data integrity, preventing
unilateral damage, and deploying such encoded data over mutually distrusting clouds [6, 7] ex-
tends these properties to less trustworthy infrastructures (such as public clouds or, as is the case
for the PriLock Data Vault, private clouds in the PEA premises to protect this highly-sensitive
data at the highest degree possible).
The design is based on the works of [6, 7]. As Figure 4 shows, all starts with a register or file
access request, read or write. Connecting to Figure 3, this request would be part of the workflow
execution (3), PIS acting as clients. Let us imagine a write request. A key is generated on the fly
(1), the file encrypted (2). Then it is split in several pieces by erasure coding (4 in the example).
Key shares are calculated for the key (4) (4 in the example). Then, both the file pieces and the
key shares are scattered over several clouds, in several sites. Reading reverses these steps.
Concisely, this design leverages the natural redundancy and possibility of scattering of PDV
over several storage clouds in the PEA elements. This has the virtuous effect of complementing
the protection, by reducing the threat surface (the exposure to attacks, e.g. but not only, on
privacy) presented both to external attackers, and to insiders from within each PEA member
entity. PDV access through the VPN will thus be controlled by protocols running in the several
core PIS of the PEA, establishing consensus or matching thresholds for the operations.
These implementations should be transparent to the users, to preserve the benefits of logical
centralisation, and integrate well with the above-mentioned workflows. As sophisticated as it
may be, there is in fact technology emerging from research over the past few years, available
with a high TRL (technology readiness level) to make this objective a feasible one. Since we
foresee that ALL operations are systematically attested and certified, the integration of BFT
protocols is also an easy means to effect indelible logging and/or blockchain supported ledgers
(many, if not most of the blockchains of late are implemented based on BFT).
Security and dependability of Core subsystems: Data Protection Regulation aspects.
We foresee that the operations on the PriLock Data Vault (PDV) secure the principles of data
minimization and storage limitation followed by data protection authorities and the GDPR in
general. After post-processing of data extracted, all redundant data must be immediately dis-
posed of, and we are assuming that the remaining data is the one meaningful for the classical
operation (i.e., without PriLock) of the state services such as the NHS, for example, the identi-
fication of infected, or suspected infected subjects.
N.B.- The current baseline architecture minimizes the threat plane and achieves high re-
silience, under the premise that in this first version, the most pressing requirements R1-R4 are
fully met in a highly secure way. In essence, extracting efficiently and in near real-time, informa-
tion that would end up in standard systems, e.g., the NHS, albeit in a much more painful, slow
and incomplete way. For example, the identification of infected, or suspected infected subjects.
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Figure 4: Security and dependability of PriLock Data Vault storage
Other richer (and useful) services — e.g., with regard to other requirements, which we certainly
endorse — possible over the PDV information, should follow the precautionary principle of gen-
eral law, as well as the purpose limitation principle of GDPR. S.o.t.a. research has been showing
that preventing re-identification (de-anonymisation) is a quite difficult task, especially when one
has access to additional spatial-temporal events about the subjects, acquired by OSINT (open-
systems intelligence) or other means [12, 13, 25]. As such, extreme care should be taken in the
handling of that information in a more risk prone way.
With regard to maintaining the resilience level of the in-core workflows under more sophisti-
cated operations, further research is suggested on the investigation and verification of algorithms
allowing distributed privacy-preserving workflows over the VPN, for example leveraging s.o.t.a.
partially homomorphic encryption and secure multiparty computation.
3.3 Information flow
Information flow will depend on the system state and the operation mode invoked.
System states: At any given moment, the system is in one of the following states:
1. Passive - the system is working as a pruning passive listener, and keeps a minimal amount
of information, in the form of PDRs, which are encrypted and written continuously to/from
the Edge PriLock Secure Clouds (PSC) (in Telco Provider cellular Controlling Data Centers).
However, the PDRs are constantly pruned: only a recent history of PDRs is there, but
inaccessible. The Clouds are locked to operations from the VPN (and reading from the
Provider is technically infeasible). PriLock Data Vault (PDV) is either empty, or locked for
reading or writing, depending on the implementation approach. The unlocking of both the
vault and the secure clouds is a highly-critical operation, see below.
2. Alert - the system starts to operate to face a potential epidemic, and the information flow
to and through the core starts. The Edge PriLock Secure Clouds (PSC) (in Telco Provider
Cellular Controlling Data Centers) and the PriLock Data Vault (PDV) are unlocked. The
unlocking of both the vault and the secure clouds is a highly-critical operation, see below. In
this state, the system core may store raw, pre-processed and post-processed PDRs, always in
encrypted form, through the period of duration of the alert.
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Operation modes: There are several operation modes of different criticality, defining different
authorisation (access control clearance) criteria for the different entities. The modes are im-
pacted, amongst other factors, by the criticality of information with regard to privacy. Critical
information is any piece of data that has at least one PII-critical record):
• Lock/unlock – operations which materialise the change of state from Passive to Alert,
or vice-versa, namely and respectively, unlocking or locking the core Vault and the edge
Secure Clouds, and starting other services such as the CEP Engine.
• Strict push – operations are write-only, no read possible.
• Blind analysis – operations can read from encrypted data (e.g., encrypted searches), and
will be supplied the needed metadata.
• Blind processing – operations can read/write from/to encrypted data (e.g., encrypted
searches, partially homomorphic update actions), and will be supplied the needed metadata.
• Full processing – operations can read/write from/to cleartext data (e.g., record searches,
update and record creation actions), and will be supplied needed metadata, such as de-
cryption/encryption keys.
Whenever possible, operations on cleartext data should be done under protection of Trusted
Execution Environments (TEE, such as Intel SGX, or ARM TrustZone). Information containing
critical data should be encrypted before written into a PriLock repository (e.g., the PriLock Data
Vault (PDV)).
Notation:
eip - event of ordinal i, happening at p.
tx(a) - real time instant related to x, for example x = 0: start, or
x = in - entry, etc., happening at participant a.
δtx - real time interval related to x.
Tx - predefined time instant or interval, related to x. For example a message delay, or a times-
tamp of a real time instant, or other system constant or variable.
T px - idem, happening at participant p.
Edge realm:
Proximity Detail Record (PDR) are the source records containing raw relative proximity data
of phones w.r.t. a base station BSi. They are issued by each base station every minute p of
the clock, and thus synchronised at all providers. They are organised in sets of tuples of the
following format:
PDRpk
(
code(BSi), Phonek(nr, imei), ProxVectork(BSi), T
p
pdr
)
PDRp = {PDRp1, · · · , PDRpn}
The set PDRp is then encrypted.
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Figure 5: Information flow through the PriLock architecture. The recent history of encrypted
PDRs is collected in the Edge PriLock secure cloud infrastructure and, after the system is alerted,
blindly preprocessed. Given authority through the federation, PDR contacts of positive tested
individuals can be searched through blind analysis. Once records of possibly infected individuals
are found and extracted, their identity can be selectively released (e.g., to NHS), given consensual
approval through the EpiProtect members.
PDRs from Telco Provider Cellular network cells, macrocells and picocells (and PriLock
femtocells) are continuously collected by each Provider, encrypted with an asymmetric public key
made available by the PriLock Entrusted Authorities (PEA) to the Providers (or each provider
for fault independence), and then stored in push mode (unilateral write-only mode), in the Edge
PriLock Secure Cloud (PSC) (in Telco Provider Cellular Controlling Data Centers).
The timestamp of creation of the PDR, T ppdr is also annexed as cleartext metadata, for prun-
ing. From now on, this data stays at rest and can only be accessed from the Federation for
Epidemic Surges Protection (EpiProtect) VPN, through the Edge PriLock Information Switches
(Edge PIS ) (containing the edge services and connection to the VPN). A time-to-live parameter
PDRttl is set to a value defined by the NHS experts. The rationale is “how long back should
tracing go, when a first infection notice is known?” (this could be “in the country” or, experience
advises, “in the world”). This time will be a function of the disease incubation time, Tincub.
A value like at least twice or thrice the incubation time gives an idea. The PIS controls the
time-to-live parameter of each PDR record, from its Tpdr and everyday erases, through secure
delete, the PDRs whose life has expired.
VPN realm: The flow of critical information should only be made through the Federation for
Epidemic Surges Protection (EpiProtect) VPN, which runs amongst the Edge and Core PIS,
offering protocols protecting security and dependability of communication.
Core realm: Most of the time (hopefully), the system is in Passive state. As such, it is almost
empty of information, as seen above, and both the vault and the secure clouds are locked.
So, now let us analyse the information flow when the system goes to Alert state, after being
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unlocked by a highly-critical operation, see below. In this state, the system core starts analysing
and processing essentially three kinds of records:
• Raw PDRs – start coming from all Providers, during the Alert interval, as necessary for
the workflows.
• Pre-processed PDRs – Results of analysis of raw PDRs, destined to improve the precision
of determination of the PDR parameters, as well as finding and scoring simple proximity
suspicions between pairs of phones in the space-time, across different providers.
• Post-processed PDRs – Results of analysis of pre-processed and/or raw PDRs, destined to
create insights about infection propagation and chains thereof.
Pre-processing: The operations below are triggered in consequence of a certified request from
the PEA, to find out about one or more phone(s) of interest for holders being (or suspected as be-
ing) either infected or infectious (checked with the NHS). Information given is Phonev(nr, imei)
and estimated earliest infection instant Phonev(T inf min), when it is believed that holder was
potentially contaminated.
Finding suspicions: We start by finding for a phone of interest (and repeated for all phones
of interest). This operation can happen at any time during the Alert state, so we should narrow
the search in function of the incubation time Tincub (we consider this number is calculated as the
worst case (longer) and already including the margin of error).
Note that we wish to know both who could have infected the holder of v, and who v
could have been infecting after being infected. Given a phone of interest Phonev(nr, imei),
this means finding all the PDRp = {PDRp1, · · · , PDRpn} sets where v exists, and such that for all p,
T ppdr ≥ T inf min − Tincub.
So, in a time series p1, · · · , pk, we have a varying list of phones that have appeared near v,
during different parts of the time series. Consider P the set of all these phones.
Now, for each pair of phones (v, u), where u ∈ P , we find all occurrences that situate both in
some same space-time region (one or several subseries pi, · · · , pj within the p1, · · · , pk interval).
Inside that group of registers for (v, u), we refine the precision of the notion of distance
(remember we may have events from mBS, pBS, fBS) between the pair, as well as the notion of
duration (remember that there may be noise, and/or both phones e.g. may wonder at a short
distance, but between pBS and/or fBS e.g. in a mall, in an interval of minutes).
Now consider a threshold, to be defined by NHS scientists and technicians, for the minimum
spatio-temporal contact values to raise a potential contamination suspicion (boolean PCsusp), of
Proxmin and Durmin.
We analyse the data, and in result, identify hits of a condition:
PCsusp(v, u) = True if (Prox(v, u) ≤ Proxmin) ∧ (Dur(v, u) ≥ Durmin)
After this analysis, we obtain a list of “suspected” potential contamination pairs. Now, this
list is important for the PEA entities as a quick though coarse output in reaction to some event.
However, it would be necessary to continue and refine those suspicions, according to a scale of
risk of infection.
Scoring suspicions: We now continue refining the suspicions. We need to define the confidence
we put in each suspicion, PCscor(v, u). Note that there may be input from several suspicion
events, most possibly within a paging cell (mBS, pBS, fBS). For simplicity, and without loss of
generality, let us call the target of our scoring effort, a space-time region Rb, that is, a certain
interval of time in a certain limited perimeter of space.
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This is a multivariable calculation, where heuristics also find a place, in more refined future
versions, especially as the infection mechanisms of the disease start to be better known. It must
be remembered that PriLock is a generic system, for any epidemic infection to come, possibly
unknown. To give it a start, we define a simple enough function for now:
PCscor(v, u,Rb) = f(Rb, P roxavg(v, u), Durtot(v, u), precision(Prox),
precision(Dur), density(Rb), severity(Rb))
And we create corresponding tuples with the scores and the function terms, which are stored:
PCscor(v, u,Rb) (PCscor, Rb, P roxavg(v, u), Durtot(v, u),
precision(Prox), precision(Dur), density(Rb), severity(Rb))
Rb is described by the envelope interval of time of the evaluation and the envelope of the space
area considered (i.e. paging cells). Proxavg(v, u), Durtot(v, u), account for the periods of at least
Durmin where (v, u) have been at or nearer than Proxmin, summing-up and integrating that time
(Durtot(v, u)), and also considering how actually close they were on average (even below the min)
(Proxavg(v, u)). That is, if there were 4-5 of periods, e.g., walking in a mall separated by short
intervals, and they were even closer than the min, the whole summed-up duration and the real
distance should be reflected in the score. Conversely, if two subjects were located as being not
too near under a same fBS, but they were e.g., sitting in a restaurant for over a couple of hours,
that should as well be reflected in the score. The parameters precision(Prox), precision(Dur),
are heuristic contact evaluation factors accounting for the coverage of the translation of digital
proximity to actual contact.
Remember that PriLock assumes a default baseline measurement approach based on the cel-
lular apparatus, for inclusion, fairness and completeness. As said before, it welcomes integration
of other approaches on a voluntary basis, which may complement information in specific situ-
ations and areas, e.g., those implemented by GPS, Bluetooth, Wifi or other. However, given
recent discussions18 care must be taken to make that integration in a way taking into account
the non-functional objectives (R7-R10), in particular digital sovereignty.
Parameter precision(Prox), accounts for a scale of quality of the method of measurement of
distance (mBS, pBS, fBS, BLE, Wifi, GPS, etc.).
Parameter precision(Dur), accounts for a scale of quality of the measurement of the real
infecting contact. It may assume a default value for lack of more information, but may take
into account specific additional information when the algorithm is improved, such as speed of
trajectory of v, u in Rs, outside/inside, vehicle, stopped (e.g. sleeping), short (at a room), etc.
Parameter density(Rb) is specific of the space-time region and accounts for the average
density of phones (number over useful range) registered in it during the interval in appreciation.
It may be a provider-supplied parameter, or can be obtained from the PDR data, but can
assume a default value for a start. Parameter severity(Rb) is again a heuristic parameter that
may assume a default value for lack of more information, but may take into account specific
additional information when the algorithm is improved, e.g., the social role of Rs area: street,
theatre, mall, restaurant, hospital, retirement home, etc.).
Whatever the function, PCscor will be discretised to assume a range of discrete values, for
practical utilisation by the PEA. Let us assume a range of 1-4, where highest means highest
risk of the potential contamination (this is conveyed quite well by the function terms, since risk
magnitude = probability * impact): 1- Low; 2- Moderate; 3- High; 4- Very High.
The mission of PriLock in this case is to evaluate the risk of contamination between a pair
of phone holders as precisely as possible, also with input from PEA, e.g., w.r.t. to the heuristic
18https://www.letemps.ch/economie/singapour-tracage-app-degenere-surveillance-masse
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parameters. At this point, the diagnostic for a set of (v, u) pairs is done, both in terms of boolean
early warning suspicions, and a grading of those suspicions. The score gives an opportunity for
selective handling. Several differentiated actions can be triggered as a function of the score, to
be defined by the NHS/PEA.
Post-processing: There will be several avenues for post-processing. Upon analysis of the
pre-processed data, the PEA entities will decide for several courses of action w.r.t. each pair,
depending on the above risk classes. These may imply further analysis of the information by
PriLock.
An obvious C.o.A. (course of action) for high enough PC scores of given pairs (as considered
by the NHS), besides any other actions, is to complete the potential contamination findings
related to this pair, by repeating the pre-processing steps for the other phones.
Another obvious C.o.A., as high or very high PC score pairs turn into infection-positive,
besides any other actions, are: find the potential infection chain (e.g., ordered chains of holders
of phone pairs upstream and downstream some target phones pair); find potential hotspots or
infection trajectories (e.g., resp., a very packed restaurant in fashion, or a bus with one or more
infected persons, riding from a high-level infection area to a remote yet uninfected town).
We assume again that these operations below are triggered in consequence of a certified re-
quest from the PEA, to find out about potential infection chains or potential hotspots or infection
trajectories, related to one or more phone(s) of interest for holders phones having a sufficiently
high potential contamination score (checked with the NHS).
Complete potential contamination findings: Given v, u pairs with high enough PC scores,
we should re-invoke the pre-processing steps as above for each u, and find all possible PCsusp
and then PCscor with phones other than v.
Finding the potential infection chain: In time, the majority of people part of the contacts
found in this batch should have been tested and/or signalled as sick by the NHS. We assume
earliest infection dates T inf min(v) were calculated for all v.
We go to the repository of pre-processed PCscor(v, u,Rb) registers and create a database con-
taining a new set of registers, containing only those where v and u are both known contaminated
at current time, and add the respective earliest infection times. We add as well the coordinates
of space-time region Rb where the contact was identified, as well as the median of the contact
interval:
PCcont(v, u, Rb) (v, u, Rb, coord(Rb), median(∆Tcontact), T inf min(v), T inf min(u))
Note that these PCcont registers are annotated versions of the PCscor(v, u,Rb) registers, they
tell the whole history since recorded, and T inf min() is added now. So they may refer to contact
space-time points where neither or one of v or u had yet been identified contaminated i.e., it
could be that ∆Tcontact > T inf min(). So, at this point, just by looking at one register, we do
not know whether v infected u or vice-versa. To find the chain, we have to be able to trace the
potential causality in the real-time domain, between the contact events PCcont.
The problem can be reduced to a potential causality determination problem, leading to a
partially ordered directed acyclic graph (DAG), from which many of the insights desired can be
withdrawn. We will rely on a generalisation of Lamport’s ‘happened before’ theory for logical
channels, to models allowing the determination of potential causality in the temporal domain for
any channels. We consider the combined analysis of the time-like separation of contamination
events, with the minimum and maximum incubation times as granularity parameters, and the
space-like separation of related contact points between two phone holders.
Finding potential hotspots or infection trajectories: Note that this will be an evolving
process, which will be updated as more phones from holders tested positive are inserted. This
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way we can follow, and at a certain points predict, the trajectories and evolution of the epidemic.
For example, from the DAG one can create a georeferenced projection of infection charts: density,
propagation trajectories, etc. For finding hotspots, we should search the repository of positive
pairs and do a density map according to the coordinates of the respective space-time regions
Rb. As the epidemic evolves, these tools will allow the NHS/PEA to make decisions quickly,
effectively and as accurately and minimally disturbing as possible.
3.4 Security, Dependability and Resilience analysis
Security of information treatment from the base stations down to the core servers is the respon-
sibility of the infrastructure holders. The incumbents should collectively ensure:
• Storage of PDRs at the Edge Clouds with multiparty encryption technology.
• Minimisation of storage of PDRs at the Edge Clouds, by continued periodical deletion.
• Lock of the Edge Clouds for Provider read access.
• Full lock of the Edge Clouds during passive state.
• Fault and intrusion tolerance of the Core Clouds, by:
(i) enforcing ki + 1 entities to contribute to authorise and/or certify in ledger any critical
operation;
(ii) enforcing kj + 1 shares to reconstruct any decryption key;
(iii) enforcing f + 1 diverse nodes to reach consensus on operations or sets thereof on the
Clouds;
(iv) considering quorums of diverse software/hardware replicas to reach availability in the
face of faults or attacks
(v) enforcing highly secure and robust communication on the VPN.
• Minimisation of operations in the clear on critical data, leveraging:
(i) utilisation of searchable encryption technology to the extent possible;
(ii) minimisation of cleartext manipulation risk by leveraging TEEs in the compute clouds.
• Minimisation of critical data storage in the Core Clouds, namely Vault, by:
(i) eliminating data as it becomes not needed after being processed, during the Alert
state
(ii) performing secure delete of all data, as permitted by regulations, as soon as the system
enters Passive state.
3.5 Interaction with other societal systems
PriLock is destined to fulfill several societal objectives and as such close interaction is expected
with these entities. In particular, PriLock needs to be configured with parameters to be defined
by NHS scientists and technicians, and refined throughout its operation. For example, when
searching for suspicious encounters (see finding suspicions on page 17), the incubation time needs
to be adjusted to the knowledge epidemiologists have gathered about the current infection.
Epidemiology experts are also expected to benefit from post-processed information supplied
by PriLock, especially during the active stages of infections and epidemics. However, even though
PriLock would rely on established procedures and regulatory frameworks (approval from ethics
committees, etc.) to grant access to this information on an urgent need to know basis, by
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enabling authorized entities to extract sanitized statistical information and pseudomized data
sets, we believe further research is required to ensure the protection of citizens rights, in particular
privacy, for less urgent needs.
3.6 Cross-border interoperability
Figure 6: Cross-border infection chain tracing through PriLock
One aspect of interaction we wish to highlight here, is the interoperability with systems
applied in other countries. PriLock is by design a single nation system in the sense that through
PriLock citizens entrust their PII data to the federation of entrusted legal authorities, either
elected, or appointed by an elected government, and which form the EpiProtect . As such,
federations or members of other countries have in principle no right over these citizens’ PII data.
However, it is of course essential to be able to follow infection chains across countries and to
alarm the respective authorities about the possibility of an infection, or worse a new outbreak.
Much like roaming supports foreigners to obtain access to the mobile communication net-
work, PriLock is trivially cross-border interoperable by not revealing the identity of foreigners to
another countries EpiProtect . Instead, the final step of reidentifying the person behind the PDRs
it creates is reserved for the country this person lives in. More specifically, PDRs ultimately can
reveal the space-time coordinates where infections may have happened and the contacts this
person had, including the country she lives in, but to reidentify this person, authority of the
EpiProtect of this person’s country will be needed. Figure 6 illustrates this point.
Barring the technical details, the existing good collaboration between national health in-
stitutes in Europe and world wide, already suffices to continue tracing infection chains across
borders by a simple exchange of those found encrypted phone-identifying tokens, which only the
EpiProtect of the respective country will be able to decrypt to reveal the person behind. Al-
though much easier with PriLock instances on both sides of the border, which continuously track
the infected and his contacts through PDRs, the possibility of the home country’s EpiProtect to
learn about the phone and its owner continues to work with fundamentally other tracing systems.
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